A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans by Schwartz, Gary T.
A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating
Uninsured Motorist Plans
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I. INTRODUCTION
This essay is an expansion of a presentation that I made at the AALS
Mini-Workshop on Tort Crisis and Tort Reform, in Los Angeles on January 3, 1987.
The essay identifies uninsured motorist programs as its subject matter; it shows how
only a fraction of uninsured motorist payments provide reimbursement for actual
out-of-pocket losses; it criticizes uninsured motorist plans for their failure to
concentrate on these losses; and it identifies three ways of reformulating uninsured
motorist programs, one of which it rejects but two of which it alternatively endorses.
The remainder of this Introduction is devoted to explaining how it happened that I
selected uninsured motorist plans as the topic for my presentation.
The entire question of tort reform turns out to pose a real and vexatious problem
for a person like myself-a person who defines himself not as a law reformer, but
rather as a scholar who happens to work on projects within the field of torts. My sense
of vexation came to the fore this spring when Proposition 51 was on the ballot in
California. (The thrust of 51 was to retain the rule of joint-and-several-liability for the
plaintiff's economic losses but to abandon the rule in its application to pain and
suffering damages.)' During the elaborate multi-million-dollar campaign on Propo-
sition 51, both colleagues at school and neighbors at home began asking me whether
tort law's pain-and-suffering awards have indeed become too large; the response that
I, as impartial academic, 2 was inclined to give was that the various scholars who have
considered this question have come to different conclusions, depending on the
specific philosophy of tort to which they adhere.3 This response, however, was one
that my colleagues found not altogether satisfactory, and that my neighbors regarded
as essentially worthless. Similarly, when asked by colleagues and neighbors about the
actual extent to which tort liability rules achieve deterrence, and what the loss of
deterrence would be if the extent of liability were reduced by (say) twenty to forty
percent in suits against local governments, my perplexed and unhelpful response was
that I could not tell, since I know of only a limited number of studies of actual
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. The proposition was voted in by a wide margin; it is now codified as CAL. CIVI. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp.
1987).
2. For a partial explanation of my impartiality, see note 6, infra.
3. Patricia Danzon, for example, examines pain-and-suffering awards from the perspective of the economics of
insurance and finds them too large; in light of the economics of deterrence, however, she recommends that (reduced) tort
awards be supplemented by uninsurable fines imposed on the tortfeasor. P. DAwON, MiCAL MAU'RAcncE 151-73 (1985).
It is not possible to ascertain from her text what her position would be if a legislature were considering a
pain-and-suffering cap without any system of fines in the same package.
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deterrent effects in all of tort law, 4 not one of which bears on the extent of deterrence
when tort rules are applied to public agencies.
My situation of vexation in the face of problems of tort reform influenced my
attitude when I was first invited by the AALS Planning Committee to make a reform
proposal at this session.5 As I pondered the invitation, what I decided was that I
would be willing to select and advance a proposal even if its actual substantive
importance could be disparaged as modest, so long as the proposal clearly satisfied
a number of conditions. The first of these conditions was that the proposal should be
original. Secondly, the proposal should be interesting to think about. Third, the issues
it raises should be at least germane to the issues at stake in the current tort reform
debate. Finally, the proposal should be consistent with a variety of tort philosophies
in a way that would both allow the proposal to appeal to a broad audience of tort
scholars and relieve me of any obligation to commit myself, in my own short
presentation, to any one of these philosophies. 6
Having developed these criteria, I initiated the search for a specific reform
proposal. In the course of this search, I became impressed with the idea that issues
of tort liability standards have tended to be overworked and overdiscussed in
contemporary tort scholarship; in light of this, I thought, it might be difficult to locate
a purely doctrinal idea that could be both valuable and original. On the other hand,
my sense was that issues relating to insurance-and the conjunction of insurance and
tort liability rules-have been badly underdeveloped in the tort literature. 7 Accord-
ingly, there was a greater possibility of coming up with an insurance-related proposal
that might comply with my conditions of value and originality.
In further reviewing the range of insurance practices that bear on the tort system,
I began to pay attention to uninsured motorist plans. While these are plans that are in
effect, by statute, in almost every state,8 they have been generally neglected by legal
academics. From what I can tell, uninsured motorist plans go largely undiscussed in
torts classrooms: noteworthy here is one leading coursebook, which, despite its stated
general interest in "tort and accident law," allocates exactly one paragraph to
uninsured motorist.9 In a similar fashion, the format of the leading insurance
coursebooks suggests that underinsured motorist plans do not receive extensive
discussion in law school insurance courses.10 If uninsured motorist issues have
4. The studies are reviewed, from a perspective that may be too skeptical, in Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort
Law, 73 CAuF. L. Rav. 555, 586-90 (1985).
5. To clarify: I myself served on this Committee--but was invited to make this presentation by the Committee's
other two members.
6. In my own scholarship, I have displayed strong interest in several of these philosophies, but have wholly
affiliated myself with no one of them.
7. The beginning of a new surge of interest in insurance among tort scholars can be found in K. ABRas.i,
DIsrIBtriNG RISK (1986).
8. See infra text accompanying note 28.
9. See P. KEErON, R. KEsroN, L. SARGEccH & H. STmR, ToRT AND Acci-rDEr LAw 889 (1983).
10. See R. KrFHoN, BAsic isuPmNcE LAw 115-20, 259-65 (2d ed. 1977); W. YouNo & H. HoLtMES, INSuRANcE
401-404 (2d ed. 1985).
The response to my AALS presentation led me to realize that the law professors who know uninsured motorist plans
best are those teaching conflicts-since several leading choice-of-law cases have concerned uninsured motorist insurance.
See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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evidently been overlooked by torts and insurance teachers, in general they have
likewise been neglected by torts and insurance scholars. While there is a useful
treatise by Professor Widiss, now in its second edition,"I in the years since 1970 there
has not been a single article on uninsured motorist in any of the major law reviews;
for that matter, those law reviews have yielded only two such articles in the entire
thirty year history of uninsured motorist plans.12 Two of the major characteristics of
uninsured motorist plans that are dwelled on below have been barely mentioned in the
scholarly literature; accordingly, my critical diagnosis of existing uninsured motorist
plans is almost entirely novel. 13
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNINSURED MOTORISTS
Before considering uninsured motorist programs, one needs to know the facts
about the social and legal situation of motorists who drive without insurance. A
background point is that by the early twentieth century American courts had
banished earlier doubts and confirmed that contracts providing insurance against
tort liability were valid and legally enforceable. 14 As soon as private automobiles
started to become common in the 1920's, private insurance companies began
offering liability insurance policies to motorists. During this era of wholly voluntary
liability insurance, only thirty to forty percent of all motorists elected to make
the liability insurance purchase. 15 Moreover, many of the motorists who were
without insurance were also without assets that could be relied on to pay off a tort
liability judgment. By the late 1930's, state legislatures had become concerned about
the extent to which the victims of negligent motorists were without viable
compensation claims. Responding to this concern, the legislatures in a handful of
states adopted statutes directly compelling the purchase of auto liability insurance. 16
Far more popular among the states were "financial responsibility" statutes; these
statutes impose on motorists a requirement of insurance (or proof of solvency) only
after the individual motorist is involved in an actual accident producing significant
harm. 17 In recent years, a significant number of states have moved away from
financial responsibility in the direction of compulsory insurance-a move often
undertaken in conjunction with the adoption of auto no-fault plans.18
Over time, the enforcement of this variety of insurance requirements has reduced
but not eliminated the phenomenon of uninsured motorists. In states with compulsory
11. A. Wmss, UNwsuss AND UNmuwnsu .a Mosoms-r INsusANcE (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter A. WDISS]. This essay
will demonstrate the usefulness of the treatise by citing it frequently. For California, see P. EisLER, CAUrORNIA UNINSURED
MoToRISr LAw (4th ed. 1986).
12. Laufer, Insurance Against Lack of Insurance? A Dissent from the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 227 (1967); Widiss, Perspectives on Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 497 (1967). I rely here on the
bibliography in 1 A. \WIDSS, supra note I1, Appendix C 131-35, and on a "top 15" notion of "major law reviews;" my
concept of "article" does not include student comments.
13. But see infra note 47.
14. W. PiossER & P. KE-ro, ToRTs 585-86 (5th ed. 1984).
15. See Wagner, Safety Responsibility Laws-A Review of Recent Developments, 9 GA. B.J. 160, 168 (1946).
16. Until 1956, Massachusetts was the only state with compulsory insurance; New York and North Carolina joined
the ranks in 1956 and 1957 respectively. See 1 A. Wmiss, supra note 11, at 5 & n.6.
17. On the variety of financial responsibility plans, see id. at 4-7.
18. See id. at 17, 59.
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insurance, the number of noncomplying motorists is at least one percent.19 In some
financial responsibility states (such as Illinois) the number of uninsured motorists can
rise as high as twenty percent.20 Nationwide, the number of uninsured motorists is
estimated to be in the vicinity of eight percent. 21 Moreover, for various demographic
and psychological reasons, those motorists who are without insurance end up being
involved in a disproportionately large number of auto accidents. 22 Accordingly, the
percentage of potential tort claims that can be frustrated by the motorist's lack of
insurance may well be significantly greater than the percentage of motorists who are
themselves without insurance. Given the combination of compulsory insurance in
some states and a range of financial responsibility requirements in others, I will
hereinafter refer to auto liability insurance as "required or semi-required" by law. An
important further point is that the insurance policy that the motorist is required or
semi-required to buy is only for a limited amount: in a number of states, the statute
calls for 15/30 coverage (that is, $15,000 per claim and $30,000 per occurrence). 23
In any event, the explosion in auto sales in the years following the Second World
War led to a new round of legislative reviews of the entire question of auto
insurance. 24 Once again, the alternative of compulsory insurance was given serious
consideration; likewise, states assessed the possibility of state-sponsored unsatisfied
judgment funds, which could be financed by levies on all motorists.25 In 1955,
certain auto insurance companies-in an evident effort to stave off the adoption by
states of either compulsory insurance or unsatisfied judgment measures-began to
offer uninsured motorist coverage in their own auto policies.2 6 Two years later, New
Hampshire responded to this insurance company initiative by requiring the inclusion
of such coverage in auto policies.2 7 By now, there are forty-nine states with uninsured
motorist statutes on their books.2 8 In seventeen states uninsured motorist coverage is
mandatory in every insurance policy. 29 In the remaining thirty-two states, insurance
companies are obliged to offer this coverage, but the purchasers of insurance are
given the option of rejecting it.30 In most of these states, any such rejection must be
expressed in writing, often on a form approved by the state insurance commis-
sioner.3 1 Moreover, state courts have nurtured the idea that any rejection of uninsured
motorist coverage by the motorist must be "knowing and deliberate." '32 Hence, the
insurance company is required to make an extra effort in order to make sure that the
19. See id. at xv.
20. See id. at 16, n.52.
21. See id. at 15.
22. See id. at 16; W. PRossER & P. KEroN, supra note 14, at 597.
23. National information is presented in U.S. Department of Transportation, Compensating Auto Accident Victims
25-64 (1985).
24. See I A. Wtiss, supra note I1, at 9-10.
25. See id. at 8.
26. See id. at 10-13.
27. See id. at 13-14.
28. See id. at 21. The exception is Michigan, where there are special circumstances. See infra note 107 and
accompanying text.
29. See 1 A. Wmiss, supra note 11, at 29, n. 19.
30. See id. at 29-35.
31. See id. at 30.
32. Grimes v. Elite Ins. Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 130, 137, 146 Cal. Rptr. 808, 811 (1978).
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motorist understands what he is doing. As I myself found out a few months ago, in
California any applicant for auto insurance who wants to turn down uninsured
motorist coverage is subjected to a number of delays and burdens before he is allowed
to exercise his preference.
Given these characteristics of various uninsured motorist statutes, I will
hereinafter refer to uninsured motorist as coverage that state law "requires or strongly
encourages." Uninsured motorist plans are designed, of course, to protect against the
risk of motorists who are without that insurance which state law requires or
semi-requires. Accordingly, uninsured motorist coverage itself generally contains
policy limits that are equal to the amount set in the state's auto liability insurance
statute. 33 Thus, in a 15/30 financial responsibility state, 15/30 is the amount of
uninsured motorist coverage that state law will require or strongly encourage. 34
Even in states in which uninsured motorist coverage is only strongly encour-
aged, it evidently is widely purchased. Ninety-one and ninety-nine percent are the
figures that have been cited for Nebraska and North Carolina;35 one leading insurance
carrier has advised me that in Los Angeles County ninety-four percent of its
customers accept uninsured motorist.36 The low rate of rejection that is implicit in
these acceptance figures is undoubtedly due, in part, to the burdens that state law
imposes on both the insurer and the insured if a rejection of uninsured motorist
coverage is being considered. Doubtless, it is likewise due to the fact that the threat
of being injured by an uninsured motorist is a threat that most insureds seem to regard
as especially "available" 37 or credible. (The reader is here invited to fill in his own
stereotype of the motorist who drives without insurance.) 38
In order to convey some sense of the monetary burden that drivers bear in
accepting uninsured motorist coverage, I here set forth quotations that I have recently
received from four insurance companies for my own auto insurance. Both bodily injury
liability and uninsured motorist coverage are for the 15/30 legal minimum; property
damage liability is for the $10,000 minimum amount that insurers are willing to offer.
Bodily Injury Property Damage Uninsured Motorist
Liability Liability Coverage
Company A $ 292 $ 136 $ 82
Company B $410 $159 $ 117
Company C $220 $ 82 $ 48
Company D $ 398 $ 162 $ 58
A review of these quotations shows that the price of uninsured motorist insurance-
at least for a person who is in my situation-ranges from fifteen to twenty-eight
33. See I A. Vmiss, supra note 11, at 379.
34. See the chart in 1 A. winiss, supra note 11, Appendix B 128--29.
35. See O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61,
79 n.52 (1986).
36. 1 have promised institutional anonymity to all the insurance officials with whom I have spoken in preparing this
essay.
37. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SciENcE 1124, 1127-28
(1974).
38. Keep in mind that many teenagers are insured through their parents.
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percent of the price of bodily injury coverage and from thirty-six to seventy-three
percent of the price of property damage coverage. In interpreting my own situation,
the following factors should be taken into account. First, California is an extremely
high-cost liability state; also, it is a financial responsibility jurisdiction with a large
number of uninsured motorists. The fact that I have had a clean driving record in
recent years serves to reduce my liability premium; yet since uninsured motorist
claims result from accidents that are largely imposed by external circumstances upon
an innocent victim,3 9 insurance companies do not concern themselves with the
individual's driving record in determining his uninsured motorist premium. Thirdly,
there are variations from area to area in the number of uninsured motorists-or more
precisely, the number of accidents resulting from the negligence of uninsured
motorists. In light of this, uninsured motorist premiums are subjected to a process of
territorial rating. Within California, I am told, the premium in territories with the
worst claims record is at least twice the premium in the territory with the best record.
While my own "territory" is inhabited by relatively affluent motorists most of whom
have insurance, we are adjacent to the Venice-Ocean-Park territory, in which a lack
of insurance is more common; as a result of this, the premium for uninsured motorist
in my own territory is somewhere in the middle range. Meanwhile, in South-Central
Los Angeles, there are low-income neighborhoods in which as many as seventy
percent of all motorists may be without insurance. 40 Uninsured motorist coverage is
hence quite expensive within these insurance territories; yet in these locations the
discretionary or disposable income available to insurance buyers is obviously at its
lowest levels. One is therefore not surprised to find that in South-Central Los
Angeles, the acceptance rate for uninsured motorist can get as low as eighty-one
percent. Yet eighty-one percent remains quite a high figure; so long as the purchase
of uninsured motorist coverage remains anywhere within the eighty-one to ninety-
nine percent range, it is obviously appropriate to say that uninsured motorist coverage
is very widespread.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH UNINSURED MOTORIST PROGRAM
To recap: under the compulsion or pressure of state law, uninsured motorist
coverage is extensively purchased; moreover, its purchase price in many jurisdictions
cannot be regarded as trivial. There is reason, therefore, to enquire into the elements
of this insurance coverage. What uninsured motorist insurance entails is an extremely
interesting combination. The language conventionally employed in an uninsured
motorist policy specifies that "the [insurance] company will pay all sums which the
insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover as damages . . . because of bodily
39. As of 1970, the motorist whose injury was concurrently caused by his own negligence was barred from
recovering in tort-and hence under uninsured motorist insurance-by his own contributory negligence. Given the switch
from traditional contributory negligence to comparative negligence, this motorist is presumably now entitled to a partial
recovery from his own uninsured motorist carrier. See I A. WIDss, supra note 11, at 199-200 (describing uncertainties
in the case law).
40. See L.A. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
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injury sustained by the insured, caused by [the use of an] uninsured highway
vehicle .... "41 The rights to recover under the policy are thus defined by the
ordinary rules of tort liability for personal injury; these rights are asserted, however,
not against the tortfeasor herself, but rather against the insured's own insurance
carrier. To repeat, within uninsured motorist insurance, third-party liability rights are
implemented through a first-party insurance mechanism.
This is an arrangement that produces a number of certainly noteworthy results.
First, consider the victim of a negligent but uninsured motorist who incurs medical
bills on account of his accident-medical bills, however, that he is reimbursed for by
a health insurance policy that he holds through his job. In light of the collateral source
rule that prevails in tort claims, in any tort suit brought by the victim against the
negligent motorist, the victim would be able to recover in full without any reduction
that might take into account the payments from the collateral source. If the negligent
motorist is uninsured, the victim then claims against his own insurance carrier. And
because of the way in which the rights that are enforced by uninsured motorist plans
are originally defined by tort liability rules, the victim in this claim against his own
insurance company can likewise recover for all his medical bills, with no attention
paid to the fact of their reimbursement by his own health insurer. Indeed, that the
collateral source rule "applies" to uninsured motorist claims is a point that is so
obvious that one can find it confirmed only by indirection in uninsured motorist
treatises. 42 Its obviousness results, of course, from the "pay all sums" language in
the uninsured motorist policy.43 That language is taken so seriously as to allow a
victim, at least in some jurisdictions, to secure a double recovery for his medical bills
from his own insurance company: once from the "medical payments" provision of
his insurance policy, and then all over again through the uninsured motorist portion
of that policy.44
Secondly: if a person is injured by a negligent motorist, in his suit against that
motorist a large portion of the victim's eventual tort recovery will typically be for
pain and suffering. If the motorist is uninsured, that pain-and-suffering claim is now
asserted by the victim against his own first-party insurer. 45 Insurance companies in
California with whom I have spoken indicate that something like sixty-five percent of
all payouts for uninsured motorist claims are in fact attributable to victims' pain and
suffering. To be sure, this figure is no more than a ballpark estimate; in the eyes of
insurance companies, pain-and-suffering payments are so obviously a part of their
uninsured motorist obligations that no bookkeeping effort is made to segregate them
or keep track of their amount.
Thirdly: if the victim is struck by a motorist whose behavior is sufficiently
obnoxious-for example, a motorist who is driving while intoxicated-the victim in
41. See 1 A. WEins, supra note 11, at Appendix A 14 (reproducing 1966 form of National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters). But see the somewhat different language in id. at Appendix A 8 (form of Insurance Services Office).
42. See, e.g., id. at 435-60 (discussing a specified list of "limits" on uninsured motorist coverage).
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. See I A. \VWEss, supra note 11, at 436-45. Widiss approves this result: the motorist, having paid two
premiums, has the right to receive two recoveries. Id. at 445.
45. See P. EisiRs, supra note 11, at 1-40.
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his suit against that motorist has a claim for punitive damages. 46 If the driver is not
only drunk but also uninsured, the victim asserts his tort claim against his own
insurance company. Because punitive damages are a portion of the "all sums" to
which the victim would be "legally entitled to recover as damages" in tort, in a
majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the question the victim can secure
a punitive damage payment from his own first-party insurer.4 7
As my earlier language indicated, these various results are extremely interesting.
At the same time they are exceedingly odd. The collateral source rule may well make
very good sense in ordinary tort contexts. As a matter of fairness, it is certainly
arguable that the liability of a wrongdoer for the harm that he has caused should not
be diminished by the insurance coverage that the victim has secured, in a costly way,
for his own protection. Moreover, for purposes of deterrence, the full harm that a
victim is likely to suffer is the harm that a potential defendant should be required to
reckon with as he considers his own behavior.48 That strong arguments such as these
are available to provide support for the collateral source rule in its ordinary tort
applications makes me suspicious of recent legislative efforts to modify or abrogate
the rule in these applications. 4 9 Uninsured motorist, however, is indisputably a form
of first-party insurance. When people express an interest in buying first-party
insurance, their goal generally is to protect themselves against the incurring of real
losses; they have no reason to pay money for insurance protection that merely
duplicates the protection which they have already secured for themselves by way of
preexisting insurance policies. Accordingly, to find the collateral source rule in effect
within the framework of first-party insurance is just about bizarre.
A somewhat similar analysis can be extended to the issue of pain-and-suffering
damages. Large awards for pain and suffering may well be very appropriate in
ordinary tort settings. If a wrongdoer subjects his victim to substantial pain and
suffering, then as a matter of fairness the wrongdoer should be liable to that victim
for a significant amount. Moreover, from the perspective of deterrence the risk of
pain and suffering is a large part of the risk of dangerous conduct; if the potential
tortfeasor is to be confronted with the full risk that his dangerous conduct occasions,
then the threat of large pain-and-suffering awards is an important feature of a
deterrence strategy. These valid arguments on behalf of pain-and-suffering damages
cause me to question the variously drafted "caps" that state legislatures have recently
imposed upon pain-and-suffering awards. 50 These arguments favoring pain and
suffering are undermined, however, by the shift from a third-party tort claim to a
first-party uninsured motorist claim. As a general matter, in buying first-party
insurance people are endeavoring to protect themselves against out-of-pocket losses.
Private insurance companies, though presumably interested in supplying those forms
46. See Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
47. See the holding and the cases cited in Stewart v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d
1374 (1986). Professor Widiss opposes this majority result, on grounds that punitive damages are not compensation. 1
A. Wniss, supra note 11, at 380-81.
48. See R. PosNrE, EcoNOtuc AALYSils or LAw 186 (3d ed. 1986).
49. See, e.g., ALAsr.A STAT. § 09.17.070 (Cum. Supp. 1986).
50. See, e.g., MARYLAND CrS. & Jun. PROC. Cos ANN. § 11-108 (Cum. Supp. 1986) ($350,000).
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of insurance that consumers would find attractive, do not see fit even to market or
make available general insurance coverage for pain and suffering. 51 This concern for
monetary losses in the purchase of insurance can be explained in a variety of ways.
First-party insurance enables its purchaser to shift costs from a time in his life when
money is worth relatively less to a time when money is worth relatively more. Money
is worth more when an injured person faces staggering medical bills as a result of an
injury; yet the mere fact that an individual is undergoing pain and suffering obviously
does not drive up the value of money for that individual. (Indeed, it may even drive
it down.) 52 A related evaluation is that first-party insurance takes advantage of
the technique of interpersonal loss spreading, which itself relies on the notion of the
diminishing utility of money.5 3 Yet the concept of loss spreading relates to the
spreading of actual monetary losses-and not to elements of intangible harm such as
pain and suffering, which, as a matter of literal fact, cannot be transferred or spread
at all; rather, the pain necessarily remains on the victim himself, who at best can
secure quite imperfect consolation from the receipt of even a substantial monetary
award.54 In this regard, it is noteworthy that public programs such as workers'
compensation and Social Security disability insurance, which find their bases in the
social policies of loss spreading and victim compensation, deliberately make no effort
to reimburse for pain and suffering. In all, several lines of analysis converge to bear
out the point that for purposes of first-party insurance, the coverage of pain and
suffering is generally unwise.5 5 Yet despite this point, uninsured motorist plans
require or strongly encourage motorists to buy insurance that primarily covers them
against the risk of incurring pain and suffering.
As far as punitive damages are concerned, there are intriguing arguments that
can be and have been advanced in their support-arguments concerned with the
objectives of both punishment and deterrence.5 6 These arguments, to be sure, are
properly controversial; within the law journals a splendid debate has recently been
unfolding.5 7 Still, to recognize the propriety of this controversy is to acknowledge
that the arguments favoring the imposition of punitive damages do at least satisfy
minimum conditions of plausibility. These arguments give up their plausibility,
however, when one shifts from the tort setting to the environment of uninsured
motorist coverage. Here, the majority rule permits the victim to recover punitive
51. There may be elements of pain and suffering in policies that pay a predetermined amount if the insured suffers
a specified disability or dismemberment. Such policies are no longer common, however.
52. See Friedman, What is "Fair Compensation"for Death or Injury?, 2 Ir'L REv. L. & ECON. 81 (1982); see also
Professor Priest's article elsewhere in this symposium.
53. See G. CA.esL, THE Costs or Acansrs 39-50 (1970).
54. Assume that 100 people each have $10,000 of wealth and that one of them then suffers a monetary loss of
$8,000. Spreading the loss by having each of the 100 pay $80 is a practice that finds support in the principle of the
diminishing utility of money. Assume now that the victim incurs only pain and suffering, which tort law values at $8,000.
The diminishing-utility-of-money principle would oppose taxing the remaining persons $80 apiece in order to provide the
victim with an $8,000 award to add to his original $10,000 endowment.
55. Considerations of adverse selection may also help explain the absence of first-party insurance for pain and
suffering. Professor O'Connell quotes an insurance company official as saying "No one wants to buy pain-and-suffering
insurance. But if some people did want to buy it, we would be unwilling to sell it to them."
56. See Symposium: Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982).
57. A valuable manuscript, currently in circulation, is Jason Johnston, The General Efficiency of Punitive Damages
(December 1986).
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damages from his own insurance company-even though this company has itself
been free of wrongdoing 58 and even though the company will predictably pass on to
its insureds, by way of higher premiums, the added costs that it bears on account of
its punitive damage exposure.
Most bizarre of all is the situation in Virginia. Virginia has joined the majority
position, allowing the recovery of punitive damages in an uninsured motorist claim. 59
Yet Virginia is apparently one of those jurisdictions that disallows, on grounds of
public policy, any coverage of punitive damages in a liability insurance policy. 60 In
Virginia, therefore, if a person is injured by the drunk driving of a motorist who has
purchased a liability insurance policy, the victim is not able to reach that policy in
attempting to sue the motorist for punitive damages; notwithstanding this, the victim
of an uninsured motorist who is guilty of drunk driving has a successful punitive
damage claim against his own first-party insurer. 6'
To be sure, in the auto accident setting, punitive damage claims are currently
available only in a small percentage of all cases. As a practical matter, therefore, my
observations concerning punitive damages aid uninsured motorist coverage are much
less important than my observations about the collateral source rule and pain and
suffering. Those latter sets of observations are, however, of major importance. It can
here be assumed that fifty-five percent of current uninsured motorist payouts are
attributable to pain and suffering. 62 Of the remaining forty-five percent for medical
bills and income losses, it seems safe to assume that one-third of these are covered
by collateral sources. 63 These assumptions, taken in combination, support the
appraisal that of all payments under uninsured motorist insurance, only something
like thirty percent actually reimburse the victim for net out-of-pocket losses. To a
remarkable seventy-percent extent, then, uninsured motorist coverage performs
functions that seem unrelated to what may be the motorist's real insurance needs.
IV. REFORMULATING UNINSURED MOTORIST PLANS
Having characterized above a number of the elements of uninsured motorist
programs, this essay can now explain the reform or reforms that I want to
recommend. But before undertaking the explanation, I should make clear what the
understanding is of uninsured motorist plans that these proposed reforms presuppose.
These plans can be (partially) interpreted as containing a recommendation running
58. Not considered here is the insured's claim for punitive damages against his own insurance company when that
company is guilty of bad faith in its processing of a claim. See 2 A. Wass, supra note 11, at 105-38.
59. See Lipscombe v. Sec. Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320 (1972).
60. See Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (endeavoring to apply Virginia
law).
61. There are other such oddities in uninsured motorist law. Consider the motorist whose negligence results in an
injury to a member of his own household. Given the household-member exclusion that is typical in auto liability policies,
if the motorist does have insurance, his insurance policy would not be available to the victim. Yet if the motorist is lacking
in insurance, the victim is allowed to recover from his own uninsured motorist carrier. See Salas v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 272 So. 2d I (Fla. 1972).
62. This is a compromise between the 65 percent figure mentioned earlier in the text and the 50 percent figure
suggested by P. KaroN, R. K EoN, L. SARCOnCH & H. SmmtN, supra note 9, at 891.
63. See id. A higher figure is suggested by the test cases studied in HAIIALroN, RAstxovrrz & AI.scHutLE, C. Am
EvALuATiON PROjECr: NAToIAL OvEsvEw (1987).
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from government to the driver that the driver purchase uninsured motorist coverage.
This interpretation sets up a rather obvious criterion for evaluation: if the government
intends to recommend the purchase of insurance, the insurance package in question
should be one that is sound and sensible.
Of course, uninsured motorist plans generally go beyond mere recommendation:
they typically entail some process of compelling or at least pressuring the car owner
to purchase insurance. To consider the appropriateness of this, it is useful to step back
and gain some perspective. Public programs that would assure the compensation of
accident victims have been extensively discussed in recent years. These programs can
be rendered appealing either by economic notions of loss spreading or by a sense of
social compassion in the face of serious injury. Responding to these elements of
appeal, a large number of leading tort scholars-including Abel, 64 Calabresi, 65
Fleming, 66 Franklin, 67 Harris, 68 Roger Henderson, 69 Robert Keeton, 70 O'Connell, 7'
Pierce, 72 Sugarman, 73 and Ursin7 4-have indicated their support or at least their keen
interest in compensation programs. With workers' injuries in this country already
covered by workers' compensation, highway accidents comprise the major category
of personal injuries for which compensation might be lacking. That the negligent
motorist is without assets and without liability insurance is a significant reason why
many auto accident victims might end up without compensation. It is expectable,
therefore, that scholars and policymakers who subscribe to the social policy of victim
compensation would strongly favor the retention of some version of an uninsured
motorist program. 75
To be sure, there are a range of objections that can be directed at various
victim-compensation proposals by those who might oppose their adoption; certainly,
it is worthwhile to see how uninsured motorist plans bear up when confronted with
these objections. An initial point is that many compensation programs bestow large
awards on persons who have brought about their own injuries by their own risky or
careless conduct. From a practical perspective, to provide an open offer of
compensation to the victims of such injuries might unwittingly increase the incidence
of careless conduct. 76 From a moral perspective, the person injured solely by his own
64. Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 199 (1981).
65. See G. CAtABRESi, supra note 53, at 39-64 (endorsing loss spreading as a major goal of accident law).
66. See Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193 (1984).
67. See Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. Rev.
774 (1967).
68. See D. HARRIS, Er AL., CO.FENSAo-XnoNANo SUPPORT FOR ItuNEss ABo INJURy (1984).
69. See Henderson, Should Workmen's Compensation Be Extended to Nonoccupational Injuries?, 48 TEx. L. REv.
117 (1969).
70. See R. KEuroz & J. O'Co'nwe., BAsic PROTECrtO. F R THE TRnwc AccmENr Vxir (1965).
71. See id. and just about all of O'Connell's later writings, including his entry in this symposium.
72. See Pierce, Encouraging Safety, The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAD. L. REv. 1281
(1980).
73. See Sugarman, supra note 4.
74. See Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22
UCLA L. Rev. 820 (1975) (endorsing loss spreading as a major goal of accident law).
75. Note, however, that Sugarman seems to oppose "tailored" compensation plans, on grounds that they might
detract from a more comprehensive solution. See Sugarman, supra note 4, at 622-41.
76. T. Scua.xG, CHoICE AND CONsEQUncE 7-8 (1984).
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carelessness is not the kind of innocent victim who most clearly inspires our social
compassion. 77 Assuming, then, that the variable of victim conduct is one that matters
significantly in the appraisal of compensation programs, it is noteworthy that
uninsured motorist plans handle this variable with relative ease. For under those
plans, a victim can secure compensation only to the extent that his injury is due to the
negligence of some other motorist78-a motorist, moreover, who is not only
negligent, but also irresponsible enough to be driving without insurance. (Both the
negligence of that motorist and his lack of insurance are factors that are essentially
beyond the victim's control.) 79
A second objection to compensation programs builds on the point that many
such programs would effect a subordination or abrogation of the regime of tort
liability. Yet in the view of many, there are fairness values or deterrence advantages
that inhere in a tort regime, values and advantages that should not be abandoned. 80
But whatever the ultimate merit of this objection, it does not place any serious cloud
on uninsured motorist plans. A preliminary point is that as far as auto accidents are
concerned, public policy has supplemented tort liability rules with a legal requirement
(or semi-requirement) that motorists purchase liability insurance; the immunity from
individual responsibility that auto insurance entails may well diminish whatever
benefits tort law might otherwise occasion. Yet, in any event: because of a feature in
uninsured motorist plans that has not been mentioned until now, these plans avoid any
element of tort subordination. That feature is subrogation. Admittedly, most
motorists who are without insurance are also without assets; in these typical
circumstances, the burden of liability remains on the shoulders of the uninsured
motorist carrier. In some instances, however, the negligent rilotorist may have assets
that could be reached. Even so, the victim, seeking the most convenient source of
compensation, will probably be inclined to collect from his own insurance company
rather than bringing suit against the negligent motorist. However, the uninsured
motorist carrier, having paid out this claim, can then proceed by way of subrogation
against the negligent motorist-thereby enforcing against that motorist the original
tort claim.81 (The statutory rule of subrogation in uninsured motorist coverage takes
precedence over the common law doctrine prohibiting the transfer, by way of either
subrogation or assignment, of personal injury claims.) 82 In this way, uninsured
motorist plans avoid any reduction in the effective liability to which the negligent
77. See Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (no duty to rescue when the victim's situation of peril
is due to his own voluntary and unreasonable conduct).
78. On comparative negligence, see supra note 39.
79. Traditional doctrines of tort liability might be interpreted as signifying that the victim of negligent motoring is
deserving of or entitled to a full tort recovery. The frustration of this entitlement by the motorist's lack of insurance could
then possibly be relied on to justify a full tort award for the victim within an uninsured motorist program. Any such effort
at justification would presuppose, however, a program funded by general state revenues. So long as uninsured motorist
coverage relies on first-party insurance, the first-party financing mechanism provides an essential framework for
appraising what the appropriate elements are of uninsured motorist coverage.
80. See, e.g., Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U. Cir. L. REv. 781 (1981).
81. See I A. Wmss, supra note 11, at 44-45.
82. See id. at 44.
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motorist is subject; whatever virtues may be associated with a regime of individual
liability are hence retained by uninsured motorist programs.
A third objection to compensation programs is their cost. Almost by their very
nature, such programs are expensive. When supported by public funds, they can
generate concern about levels of taxation, the size of the deficit, and the priorities
among many programs that themselves make claims upon the public fisc. All of these
concerns, however, are in a way irrelevant to uninsured motorist programs: for these
programs receive their revenues directly from motorists-motorists who, in turn, are
the beneficiaries of the programs' outlays.
This appraisal, however, serves to draw attention to another objection: the
compulsory or quasi-compulsory character of uninsured motorist insurance. After all,
the purchase of that insurance could be left to private insurance markets-markets
that were, in fact, developing in the mid-1950's, before legislatures intervened by
way of making uninsured motorist coverage at least somewhat compulsory. 83 The
standard Calabresian rationale for mandatory accident insurance is that individuals, if
left to their own psychological devices, will predictably do an inadequate job of
purchasing that insurance which does in fact promote their own best interests.8 4 This
rationale will be contested, of course, by more traditional economists;8 5 yet it may be
appealing enough for most of us. Observe, however, that the rationale contains an
obvious built-in limitation: the rationale cannot be invoked unless the insurance that
individuals are obligated to buy is in fact insurance that does promote the best
interests of at least most individuals. 86
This essay has already referred to the conventional economists who would
oppose the compulsory features of uninsured motorist insurance; let me now return to
their situation, in order to further consider their position. Despite their opposition,
these economists might well acknowledge that uninsured motorist programs are
unlikely to be repealed, both because they have been a stable part of American law
for thirty years and because their repeal would be vigorously opposed by a broad
range of policymakers and scholars.8 7 Faced with the reality of uninsured motorist
coverage as part of the status quo, these economists would at least express a
preference for a program that provides insurance that makes basic economic sense-
insurance that intelligent motorists would be inclined to buy were they given the
unconstrained option of doing so.
To summarize, then, uninsured motorist programs can be evaluated as entailing
a government recommendation, or instead as resting on elements of government
compulsion. Insofar as the programs include compulsion, they can be evaluated from
the perspective of those who regard that compulsion as appropriate, and also from the
perspective of those who find it unwarranted yet who acknowledge that uninsured
motorist programs can be expected to persevere. What is notable about all of these
83. See supra text accompanying note 26.
84. See G. C~AABRsi, supra note 53, at 55-58.
85. See, e.g., W. LUoEs & R. POSNER, THE EcoNo ic STRUCTURE Or TORT LAw 257-58 (1987).
86. For a suggestion, moreover, that motorists may, if anything, overestimate the chances of being injured by an
uninsured motorist (and hence overestimate the need for insurance), see supra text accompanying note 37.
87. For an indication of the durability of uninsured motorist coverage, see infra text accompanying note 107.
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evaluations and perspectives is that they converge on one basic point: the insurance
that the program includes should entail a sensible and intelligent insurance package.
This expression turns out, however, to set forth a test that current uninsured motorist
programs badly fail: for these programs lavish their attention on elements of detriment
other than net economic loss-elements for which insurance coverage seems
inappropriate. Accordingly, the first portion of my recommendation is this: even if
the existence of uninsured motorist plans is accepted as a given, the coverage of these
plans should be contracted so that they apply only to net out-of-pocket losses-those
losses with respect to which the social ethic in favor of insurance can plausibly be
regarded as compelling.
Before proceeding further, this essay should refer to two possible problems that
can be foreseen with respect to an uninsured motorist program that zeroes in on net
out-of-pocket losses. First, if first-party insurers were to charge motorists a premium
that was constant except to the extent that it takes the motorist's territory into account,
then "high" collateral-source insureds would end up subsidizing "low" collateral-
source insureds, in light of the way in which payments from collateral sources would
now serve to diminish recoveries. However, under the proposed reformulation, with
its emphasis on net losses, it can be expected that uninsured motorist insurers would
inquire of their applicants about the extent of the latter's principal collateral sources,
and would then set their premiums in a way that would take those collateral sources
into account. This would avoid the cross-subsidy that I would regard as unfortunate.
Secondly, if uninsured motorist carriers were to charge a flat premium to all in the
territory, there would be a prospect of a subsidy running from low-income insureds
to high-income insureds: this is a subsidy that strikes me as offensive on grounds of
both efficiency 88 and distribution. 89 Here too, however, it can be expected that under
the proposed reformulation, with its emphasis on out-of-pocket losses, uninsured
motorist insurers would inquire of applicants about the income levels of at least the
principal driver of the insured vehicle, and would consider this information in the
calculation of their premium schedules; in this way, the inappropriate cross-subsidy
can be avoided. It is noteworthy that even current practices take income levels into
account at least at the territorial level. In their aggregate, residents of Beverly Hills
who are injured by negligent motorists incur larger income losses and run up larger
doctors' bills than do injured persons who reside outside of Beverly Hills. Because
territorial pricing practices give weight to the magnitude of claims as well as to their
frequency, there is already a mark-up in uninsured motorist premiums that all in the
Beverly Hills territory are required to pay. The inequality of income levels among
people who live within the same territory is the inequality that insurance practices do
not acknowledge-but that would be dealt with once individualized information is
secured through the method suggested above.
While this essay has by now recommended a contraction of coverage for
uninsured motorist, it has not yet explained how to work out that contraction in a way
88. See Priest, A Theory of Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YtM L.J. 1297 (1981).
89. Abel, Should Tort Law Protect Property Against Accidental Loss?, 23 SAN DEEGo L. REv. 79, 96-99 (1986).
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that complies with the strategy of acknowledging uninsured motorist as part of the
status quo. In this regard, there are three distinct ways in which that status quo can
be characterized. It might be said that public policy is committed to providing
uninsured motorist coverage for all $15,000 accidents; alternatively, it could be said
that public policy is committed to providing insurance coverage for $15,000 worth of
injury; alternatively, the point may be that public policy is committed to requiring
motorists to pay a minimum premium in order to protect themselves against the risk
of injury at the hands of an insolvent defendant. Each of these depictions of the status
quo raises its own possibility as to how uninsured motorist insurance should be
reformulated. The three possibilities can be referred to as Reformulation A,
Reformulation B, and Reformulation C. In explaining each of these reformulations,
this essay will need to consider in at least moderate detail the mechanics on which
each might rely. On the basis of that consideration, this essay will reject one of the
reformulations as unworkable; the other two it will endorse as each in its own way
appropriate.
As noted, existing plans could be read as expressing the idea that the plan should
apply up to the point at which the victim suffers an injury that is valued by tort law
at $15,000. If this is the key idea, then uninsured motorist plans, in order to effectuate
the contraction here recommended, could be reformulated so as to allow the victim
to recover only for that portion of the $15,000 of damages that entails the victim's
own net monetary losses. In light of the premium data that have been arrayed
above,90 it can be assumed that the current annual cost of uninsured motorist coverage
can be expressed as $50. (This figure is on the low side for my own territory in Los
Angeles, but may well be on the high side for most of the nation.) Under
Reformulation A, the basic compensation function of uninsured motorist plans could
be preserved while cutting the price of uninsured motorist coverage from an annual
$50 to a sum closer to $15.91 This Reformulation would thus achieve a cost savings-
a minor savings, perhaps, for the individual motorist, but a major savings for
motorists in the aggregate.
Such a reformulation hence makes plenty of sense, at least in the abstract. On
closer inspection, however, the reformulation would lead to administrative difficul-
ties that are probably unacceptable. Assume that a victim suffers an injury that tort
law might value at something like $30,000; assume further that the net out-of-pocket
losses attributable to this overall injury are in the vicinity of $10,000. If the victim can
recover from her own uninsured motorist carrier for only the net out-of-pocket portion
of the "first" $15,000 of the victim's injury, how would the law go about the process
of identifying that "first" $15,000 of harm and the size of its net out-of-pocket
component? The "first" $15,000 could refer to those elements of harm that occur
first in some temporal or chronological sense. But if so, then the judge or arbitrator 92
90. See supra text accompanying note 39.
91. Fifteen dollars is thirty percent of S50. Since uninsured motorist is an extra endorsement in a policy that is being
written for independent reasons, my assumption is that the overhead uniquely contributed by uninsured motorist is low.
92. Uninsured motorist policies typically establish arbitration as the technique for resolving most of the disputes
between insurer and insured. See 2 A. Woiss, supra note 11, at 139-46.
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would need to work out a chronology for the victim's pain and suffering and to
coordinate that chronology with the chronology of the medical bills and the income
losses incurred by the victim. Yet such an enterprise would clearly seem to be
expensive and unrewarding; the judgment-calls that it would require would likely be
quite arbitrary. Given the awkwardness if not infeasibility of the procedure that
Reformulation A would necessitate, that Reformulation should not be supported.
Reformulation B would characterize existing uninsured motorist programs as
aiming to provide up to $15,000 of compensation and would then endeavor to
integrate that aim with the contraction of uninsured motorist coverage that I have
identified. Under Reformulation B, if a motorist driving without insurance negli-
gently inflicts injury, the victim could recover from his own uninsured motorist
carrier for all of his net out-of-pocket losses-up to a maximum of $15,000. Figuring
out how Reformulation B would actually take effect requires some effort; in
expending this effort, it is helpful to take up several hypotheticals. (1) Under existing
uninsured motorist coverage, the victim of a $15,000 accident, of which $4,500
consists of net out-of-pocket losses, receives $15,000; under Reformulation B, he
would receive only $4,500. (In these circumstances, Reformulation B leads to a result
that is the same as the result that was suggested by Reformulation A.) (2) Currently,
the victim who suffers a $30,000 injury, of which $10,000 is net out-of-pocket
losses, recovers $15,000 from her own insurance company. So long as her
out-of-pocket losses are $10,000, her recovery under my Reformulation B would be
limited to $10,000. (3) Under current uninsured motorist insurance, the victim of a
$70,000 injury recovers $15,000 from his own insurer. Under Reformulation B, if
this person's net out-of-pocket losses equal $21,000, he would likewise receive a
$15,000 insurance payment. One feature of this latter outcome merits commentary.
In form, Reformulation B appears to result in uninsured motorist plans' somehow
"applying" to injuries that are more serious than those to which the plan in its
existing form applies. In fact, however, the selective character of the compensation
objectives of Reformulation B turn out to signify that the payouts to victims of serious
accidents under Reformulation B would, in their amounts, considerably resemble the
payouts to the same victims under the current program.
In order to render understandable one further attribute of Reformulation B, there
is an additional feature of current uninsured motorist plans that needs to be explained.
Hypothetical (4) concerns the victim who suffers a $50,000 injury. Under current
law, the victim receives a $15,000 uninsured motorist award, while retaining a
$35,000 tort claim that she can bring against the negligent motorist, if the latter has
any assets. 93As noted, the uninsured motorist carrier has its own claim against that
motorist, by way of subrogation. 94 Existing uninsured motorist plans include some
arrangements for consolidating the claim of the victim and the claim of the insurer,
93. There is a complication here, for some courts honor provisions in uninsured motorist contracts that specify that
the carrier's liability to the victim is reduced by the amount of any tort recovery that the victim receives from the negligent
motorist. See 2 A. \VWiiss, supra note 11, at 64-67. This issue is the cognate of the issue discussed in supra text
accompanying note 88.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
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thereby reducing the likelihood of any undue duplication of litigation. 95 So long as
the assets held by the motorist exceed $50,000, then the combined claims of the
victim and the insurance company can be enforced without difficulty. However: if the
motorist's assets are less than $50,000, the question arises as to the relative priority
of the victim's $35,000 tort claim and the carrier's $15,000 subrogation claim.
In considering this question, states have reached somewhat diverging positions.
The majority view, however, is that full tort compensation for the victim remains the
primary goal of public policy, and that the victim's claim therefore deserves
priority.96 For example, if the negligent motorist has assets worth $10,000, the victim
secures these $10,000, the carrier nothing. To establish priorities in this way seems
plausible to me; accordingly, in the interest of not unnecessarily disturbing the status
quo, I would retain this priority as an incident of Reformulation B. There is, perhaps,
a need to make clear what the victim's supplemental tort would include. Under the
current uninsured motorist program, the victim's claim against the negligent motorist
is for the excess of damages over the first $15,000 of damages; under Reformulation
B, the victim's claim against that motorist would be for those portions of tort damages
that relate to pain and suffering, and also those losses incurred by the victim for which
he has received reimbursement from collateral sources.
Having clarified the status of the victim's claim against the negligent motorist
under Reformulation B, I need to consider how that Reformulation would deal with
hypothetical (5). In this hypothetical, the victim suffers a $30,000 injury, $9,000 of
which relates to net economic loss; meanwhile, the negligent motorist is in fact
covered by the $15,000 liability policy that is required or semi-required by law.
Under the current program, this victim, by hypothesis, does not have an uninsured
motorist claim: the defendant is minimally insured. However, since that insurance
provides only a $15,000 award, the current plaintiff who seeks the full $30,000 in
compensation must sue the defendant personally for the $15,000 excess, hoping that
the defendant has the assets that would satisfy a tort judgment. Under Reformulation
B, the uninsured motorist program might be said to "apply" to the full $30,000
accident: it would compensate for all his net out-of-pocket losses, up to $15,000, that
are included within that $30,000. But something seems wrong with this statement: for
once again, the negligent motorist is covered by an insurance policy that meets the
legal minimum.
There certainly is a problem here, but the problem is one that proves capable of
solution. All that is needed is for the program's statute to stipulate that payments
coming from a liability insurance policy should be interpreted as payments that
compensate the plaintiff for his net economic losses-until the point is reached at
which those losses have been fully reimbursed. Given this stipulation, if the negligent
motorist does have a $15,000 liability insurance policy, then the victim does receive
full compensation for his net economic losses-and Reformulation B does not come
into play. Hypothetical (6) can provide further clarification. In this hypothetical-
95. On the strategic complexities in California, see 1 P. EisR, supra note 11, at 17-12 to 17-17.
96. See 2 A. WVnsss, upra note 11, at 84-87.
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which is an expansion of hypothetical (3)-the plaintiff again suffers a $70,000 injury
that includes $21,000 of net economic losses, while the negligent motorist is now
covered by a $15,000 policy. Because the plaintiff receives liability insurance
payments for the first $15,000 of the net economic loss, he is without rights against
his own insurer for the remaining $6,000.
Let me now review the hypotheticals that might arise under Reformulation B.
This Reformulation would strongly reduce the program's payouts in a large number
of small-injury cases (hypothetical 1); it would moderately reduce payouts in
medium-injury cases (hypotheticals 2 and 5); in a smaller number of larger-injury
cases it would preserve the current program's payouts (hypotheticals 3 and 6); in no
case would the payout under the Reformulation exceed that provided by the current
program. In the aggregate, then, the Reformulation would significantly decrease the
program's outlays. To a corresponding extent, it would reduce the premiums that
insurance companies charge. To be sure, the benefits available under Reformulation
B would be broader than those provided by Reformulation A; therefore, the reduction
in premiums under B would not be as sharp as the reduction that would be effected
by A. To illustrate, under Reformulation B, the premium for uninsured motorist
coverage might decline from $50 to $30.
It might be quite reasonable, however, to adopt the position that any such
decline is inappropriate. For quite possibly, existing uninsured motorist plans can be
interpreted as resting on a public-policy judgment that motorists should be required
(or strongly encouraged) to pay something like $50 per year in order to protect
themselves against the risk of being injured by a negligent motorist whose insurance
and assets are inadequate to cover his liability. 97 If it is this $50 annual premium that
should be preserved as the essence of the status quo, then the contraction of the
program so as to cover only net out-of-pocket losses could be combined with an
expansion of the program to cover net out-of-pocket losses up to perhaps a $50,000
level. Call this Reformulation C; hypotheticals (7) and (8) can provide it with
clarification. Hypothetical (7) considers the victim of an uninsured motorist who
suffers a $170,000 injury, of which $50,000 consists of net economic losses. Under
Reformulation C the victim recovers $50,000. But the statement of this result leads
directly to hypothetical (8). Assume that the victim suffers a $170,000 injury on
account of the negligence of a motorist who does have the $15,000 liability insurance
policy that is required by law. Under Reformulation C, the uninsured motorist carrier
would be responsible for the difference between $15,000 and $50,000. Reformula-
tion C would in fact do what Reformulation B merely flirted with doing: it would
include protection against "underinsurance" 98 as well as "uninsurance." However,
this is not, in and of itself, a drastic innovation: in a number of states, auto in-
surers have begun offering-as an option to the $15,000/$30,000 uninsured
motorist requirement-uninsured-and-underinsured motorist coverage at levels of
97. This, of course, is a California figure. In a compulsory insurance state, the amount would be much lower.
98. "Underinsurance" here means insurance that is less than the victim's loss. Not surprisingly, insurance
companies are unwilling to sell insurance policies for amounts that are less than the amount that motorists are required
(or semi-required) by state law to buy.
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$30,000/$50,000 or higher. 99 With Reformulation C (as with Reformulation B) one
needs to know how the program's payments would be related to the negligent
motorist's liability insurance, and also that motorist's personal liability. In this
regard, return to hypothetical (8), which concerns the victim who suffers a $170,000
tort injury, of which $50,000 is net economic losses. As with Reformulation B, the
key to synchronization is to stipulate by statute that the plaintiff's collection from
the defendant's liability insurer is primarily for net economic losses. If, therefore, the
defendant does have the legal minimum of $15,000 insurance, then the victim would
have a $35,000 claim against his own uninsured-and-underinsured motorist carrier. If
the negligent motorist has assets in addition to his insurance policy, he would be
subject to a $35,000 subrogation claim asserted by the first-party carrier and a
$120,000 residual tort claim asserted by the original victim. If the defendant does
have insurance above the legal minimum up to (say) the $50,000 level, then the
plaintiff, in collecting the full amount of that insurance, would be without any claim
against his own uninsured-and-underinsured first-party carrier; still, the plaintiff
would retain his personal $100,000 action against the negligent defendant. Accord-
ingly, that defendant's personal liability is the same as it would be in the absence of
the Reformulation. Moreover, so long as the insurer's subrogation claim and the
victim's personal claim can be appropriately consolidated,100 Reformulation C would
not occasion any actual increase in levels of litigation.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In my presentation at the AALS Mini-Workshop in January, I advanced
Reformulations A and C as the relevant alternatives. I had not yet identified
Reformulation B; moreover, because I had not yet considered its mechanics, I did not
then realize why Reformulation A would be unsatisfactory. Now that I have figured
out Reformulation B and ruled out Reformulation A, I can present B and C as the
appropriate alternatives. My hope is that a near consensus of scholars would agree
that the adoption of one or the other of these alternatives would be a desirable law
reform-an improvement upon the status quo. For those scholars who favor the basic
concept of uninsured motorist, the adoption of either B or C would make a good
program better; for those who oppose that basic concept, the adoption of either would
make a bad program less bad. For scholars who adhere to a Calabresian position,101
the amendment would convert a dumb program into a program that is intelligent, or
at least plausibly defensible. As far as the choice between Reformulations B and C
is concerned, those who are generally enthusiastic about compensation programs can
be expected to favor the more ambitious C over the more modest B; those who are
inclined to be cautious about compensation programs would probably prefer the
modesty of B to the ambitiousness of C. My own preference lies with C, although for
a somewhat special reason. As noted, I would like to make sure that insurance
99. See I A. Wiiss, supra note 1 I, at 305-308, 321-23.
100. See supra text accompanying note 95.
101. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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companies establish uninsured motorist premiums in a way that takes into account the
income levels of insureds and the collateral sources available to insureds.10 2 The
larger the liabilities that insurance companies can expect to bear for net economic
losses under uninsured motorist, the more willing they will be to gather the
information that would enable them to establish such premium differentials. Since
Reformulation C does a better job than Reformulation B in increasing the economic-
loss stakes in uninsured motorist plans, it is Reformulation C that ends up with my
support.
In any event, this essay has by now provided discussions of uninsured motorist
plans generally, the deficiencies in those plans, and the relevant alternatives. Those
discussions have aimed at being succinct and self-sufficient. With the hope that I have
at least come close to achieving my aims,10 3 1 will make no effort here to restate or
summarize my analysis. This Conclusion does need to explain, however, what
happens when uninsured motorist programs operate within jurisdictions that have
legislatively adopted auto no-fault compensation plans. More than twenty states have
enacted auto no-fault programs (although often in compromised forms that dishearten
the supporters of the no-fault idea). 1 4 No-fault itself entails a compromise between
the concept of compensation and the ordinary principles of tort. Under no-fault, the
victim recovers for his economic losses up to some "cap;" for economic losses above
that cap and for all pain-and-suffering damages in accidents that exceed the no-fault
"threshold," the victim can assert whatever traditional tort claims the circumstances
of the specific accident suggest.10 5 Given the way in which no-fault guarantees
compensation for the victim up to the cap, it might be expected that no-fault states
would see no need for an actual uninsured motorist program.1 0 6 As it happens,
Michigan, in the course of adopting a strong version of no-fault, decided to dispense
with uninsured motorist.1 0 7 However, every other jurisdiction that has adopted
no-fault has retained its uninsured motorist plan'0 8 (thereby documenting the
durability of uninsured motorist). In no-fault states, tort claims cover (as indicated)
economic losses above the cap and pain-and-suffering damages in accidents that
surpass the threshold. Given the relative levels at which typical caps and thresholds
have been set, in no-fault jurisdictions pain-and-suffering claims almost certainly
comprise an even greater percentage of tort recoveries than they do in traditional tort
102. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
103. I know I have not fully achieved my aims, since there are certain complicating factors that I have not yet taken
into account. The most important of these concerns the timing of litigation. My explanations of how the various
reformulations would work have tended to assume that the court (or arbitrator) has complete information as to the total
of the plaintiff's tort damages and his out-of-pocket losses. My explanations may need to be reconsidered, therefore, if
it is recognized that the claimant may want to receive his uninsured motorist award at a time when these final numbers
are not yet available.
104. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 35, at 62-63.
105. The various caps and thresholds are set forth in U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 23, at 23-40.
106. See R. KanroN, INsutnmcE L.Aw-BAsic Tierr 245 (1971) (in no-fault era, uninsured motorist program "seems
destined for major modification").
107. See 1 A. winss, supra note 11, at 17 n.57.
108. See id. at 17.
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jurisdictions.10 9 The adoption of no-fault hence serves to aggravate one of the basic
deficiencies in uninsured motorist that my essay has outlined. Because of this, in
no-fault jurisdictions that preserve uninsured motorist, my proposed reformulations
of uninsured motorist have a special urgency.
At the very least, the coexistence of no-fault and uninsured motorist within a
given state serves to highlight or dramatize certain policy considerations relating to
uninsured motorist plans. Obversely, this essay's discussion of uninsured motorist
plans may in a number of ways cast light on the policy considerations surrounding
no-fault itself: that is, a comparison of uninsured motorist and no-fault plans may
enable us to better understand no-fault. No-fault resembles uninsured motorist in that
each relies on first-party insurance as a response to the problem of highway injuries.
However, no-fault differs from uninsured motorist in its willingness to supersede tort
liability. Subrogation is the strong majority rule in uninsured motorist legal
arrangements;" 10 yet only a handful of no-fault juristictions afford the no-fault insurer
a subrogation claim against the liability insurer of the negligent motorist. "t' Given the
model provided by uninsured motorist plans, the observer can wonder whether the
possibility of subrogation deserves more serious consideration within no-fault-as a
way of preserving (although at considerable administrative cost)" t2 whatever the
benefits might be of a regime of tort liability.
No-fault is also unlike uninsured motorist plans in that in most states no-fault is
entirely compulsory. By contrast, in a majority of states uninsured motorist plans
include an ultimate feature of voluntariness. '13 Proponents of no-fault paint a glowing
picture of victim or consumer benefits under no-fault. 114 Yet the very portrayal of
those benefits leads the observer to ask why the choice between tort and no-fault
should not be left to the volition of the individual motorist. 115 Indeed, the possibility
of voluntary no-fault arrangements has been considered by a number of no-fault
sympathizers, including Calabresi in 1971,116 Keeton and O'Connell in 1971,117 and
O'Connell again in 1986.' Is Voluntary no-fault would be easy enough to administer
in auto accidents involving two motorists each of whom has chosen no-fault. (Each
motorist would recover from her own insurer.) Voluntary no-fault is also easy to
understand in its application to two motorists each of whom has rejected the no-fault
109. An "add-on" no-fault regime preserves all pain-and-suffering claims. See infra text accompanying note 122.
In these states, the tilt in tort awards in favor of pain and suffering is presumably even more pronounced.
110. See supra text accompanying note 81. Of course, the insolvency of most uninsured motorists reduces the
operational significance of subrogation within uninsured motorist plans.
I11. See U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 23, at 130-32.
112. Note that litigation costs would be much less under subrogation than in a pure tort regime, since insurance
companies could horse-trade large numbers of claims.
113. See supra text accompanying note 30.
114. U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 23, at 3-6.
115. See, e.g., Epstein, Automobile No-Fault Plans: A Second Look at First Principles, 13 CRsGurros L. Rav. 769,
789-90 (1980). The Kentucky no-fault program is optional. See U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 23, at 32.
As of yet, there have not been any careful reviews of the Kentucky statute-let alone any accounts of the actual Kentucky
experience.
116. Calabresi, The New York Plan: A Free Choice Modification, 71 COLu.. L. Rsv. 267 (1971).
117. Keeton & O'Connell, Alternative Paths Toward NonFault Automobile Insurance, 71 COLut. L. Rsv. 241
(1971).
118. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 35.
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option. (These motorists' compensation claims would remain determined by ordinary
tort liability rules.) The very difficult problem lies in working out the meaning of
voluntary no-fault when a specific accident involves one motorist who has elected
no-fault and another who has chosen to remain with tort. This problem has been
keenly appreciated by Calabresi, Keeton, and O'Connell, all of whom have attempted
to figure out solutions. "19 Any such solution must, at the least, allocate costs between
tort motorists and no-fault motorists in a way that both complies with considerations
of fairness and avoids exerting any undue bias on the choice that motorists would be
expected to make between tort and no-fault. Interestingly enough, O'Connell's most
recent suggestion is to rely on a major expansion of uninsured motorist coverage as
a way of building the appropriate "connector" between tort motorists and no-fault
motorists. 20 To be sure, even if such a connector can be constructed, the case on
behalf of voluntary no-fault would not be complete. For, as tort proponents could
argue, there may be fairness virtues and incentive advantages in imposing liability on
negligent motorists; any system that allows motorists, even in an ex ante way, to opt
out of the regime of tort liability is thus not free from controversy.' 2'
In this regard, however, it can be noted that in several states no-fault is a mere
"add-on" that displaces tort only in a limited way. (The no-fault payment that the
victim receives serves as an offset against any later tort liability claim. 122) Given this
limited impact on tort of add-on no-fault, the question arises whether such a no-fault
scheme could be rendered voluntary with the individual motorist. Auto insurers
already offer limited "medical payments" coverage as an option; the observer
wonders why these insurers have not been willing to offer this coverage with higher
policy limits, and why they do not seem willing to offer income interruption coverage
as well.'Z3 Lurking in the background here may well be problems of proper insurance
pricing and adverse selection. As it happens, in four states-Arkansas, South
Carolina, Texas, and Washington-add-on no-fault is offered to motorists on an
optional basis: the number of motorists electing this option is 28, 74, 59, and 66
percent, respectively. 124 For public policy purposes, there is a real need for empirical
studies of this range of election rates, 2 5 of the characteristics of those motorists who
do and do not choose the no-fault option, and of other aspects of the dynamics of
add-on no-fault in its voluntary forms.
One further feature of my discussion of the uninsured-and-underinsured motorist
problem can bring this essay towards its close. Here my point is that this problem is
somewhat peculiar to the United States. In countries such as England and Australia,
119. Calabresi, supra note 116, at 268-71; Keeton & O'Connell, supra note 117, at 257-58; O'Connell & Joost,
supra note 35, at 78.
120. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 35, at 78-80.
121. For practical problems with optional no-fault, see the somewhat garbled account in U.S. Department of
Transportation, supra note 23, at 124.
122. See id. at 41. In a few add-on states, the no-fault insurer has a subrogation right against the negligent motorist.
Id. at 132.
123. I have been told that such coverage is offered by auto insurers in Canada.
124. See id. at 42, 47-49.
125. South Carolina, with the highest acceptance rate, has the highest no-fault premiums, yet the lowest no-fault
benefit levels! Id.
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liability insurance is mandatory for motorists-and this mandate is enforced in ways
that seemingly permit no avoidance. In addition, the liability insurance that motorists
are required to buy is without policy limits-it is written for unlimited amounts. By
contrast, in this country the liability insurance that is mandatory or semi-mandatory
is merely in the 15/30 range.' 26 For that matter, even the motorist who wishes to
purchase additional insurance finds that no insurance company will provide unlimited
coverage; indeed, most insurers are unwilling to go higher than 100/300. American
studies have repeatedly shown that the victims of serious or catastrophic auto
accidents are compensated less adequately by the tort system than the victims of
minor or more moderate accidents. 127 Tort scholars have tended to assume that these
findings suggest some peculiar perversity in the tort system-perhaps the ability of
minor-accident victims to file claims that lead to disproportionate nuisance-value
settlements. ' 2 8 Yet this latter explanation I have always found curious: for the costs
and uncertainties of litigation are symmetrical for plaintiffs and defendants-and it is
the defendant's auto insurance company which, as a repeat tort player, has the
strongest interest in developing a reputation for toughness in the claims settlement
process. From my angle, the relative undercompensation of the victims of serious
injury is a result that flows inevitably from the very low amount of insurance
coverage that the law requires (and the relatively low amount of coverage that liability
insurers are even willing to write).' 29
To make this point need not entail, however, any real criticism of American
insurance practices. For there are major differences between English and American
civil procedure that bear on the feasibility of unlimited liability insurance. In
England, tort trials are by judge rather than by jury. Moreover, English judges are
few in number; they are recruited pursuant to a process that leads to their having fairly
uniform credentials and outlooks, and they are centrally headquartered in a way that
enables each to keep track of what the others are doing. Given the process of
trial-by-judge and the attributes of the judges in question, tort trials in England
generate verdicts that are substantially consistent from case to case and (by Amercian
standards) very moderate in their amounts. In these English circumstances, insurance
companies can write uncapped policies without at the same time exposing themselves
to liabilities that may be either unpredictable or open-ended. It is not my purpose here
to argue that America should jettison its commitment to trial-by-jury or reconstitute
the system by which judges are appointed. However, I do want us to acknowledge
that the American procedures to which we evidently are committed give rise to
problems that other countries, with their own legal cultures, are able to avoid.
126. In many states, however, the real-dollar protection afforded by compulsory insurance has gone down sharply
over time. In New York, for example, despite inflation, mandatory insurance levels have remained at 10/20 since the early
1960's. (A revision is now underway in the state legislature. See N.Y. Times, June 3, 1987, at 26, col. 3 (nat'l ed.)).
127. See R. KIrrro.s & J. O'CoNNEui, supra note 70, at 2.
128. See id.
129. Conceivably, low policy limits could be justified as a way of controlling the extent to which liability insurance
reduces motorists' incentives to drive nonnegligently. For a number of reasons that need not be spelled out here, I find
this rationale very hard to credit.
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But I should return now from the pretensions of comparative observations to my
narrow topic of uninsured motorist insurance. I have recommended in this essay that
uninsured motorist programs be legislatively reformed so as to provide more real
insurance per premium dollar. Even if my recommendation proves insufficiently
potent to mobilize state legislatures, I hope that my analysis has been sound enough
to persuade many readers in thirty-two states 30 to engage in a simple exercise in
self-reform: to decline to renew their own uninsured motorist coverage.
130. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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